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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CURTIS I. GORD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporaton, et al.,

t
/

Case No.
10857

Defendant and Appellant. )

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiff upon his
verified petition for a 'V-rit of Mandamus compelling
defendants to reinstate plaintiff in his employment
at the Salt Lake City cemetery. An Order granting
an Alternative 'Vrit of Mandamus was issued out of

1

the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Sal
· · · · of the action on F b t Lakt
C .oun t y, a t th e m1hahon
.
e ruary ,1
1.967. A hearmg was held on February 9 19 .·
' 67, U1
which t l1e H onora ble Stewart M. Hanson J d ·
'
U ue
ruled that a Peremptory Writ of Mandate to ~:
.
. .
compei
defendants to remstate plamhff as a city emp1Oyv
be issued and made permanent. On the 21st dav. ~:
February, 1967, defendants' motion for rehearing....
11a:,
denied but an Order holding the judgment in aberanrt
was issued by Judge Hanson in favor of defenda~ts.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The defendants and appellants seek a reversal i1)
the trial court's decision and that the case be remande1
to the lower court with instructions to enter a dismissa.
of plaintiff's petition for Writ of Mandate and an Order
recalling the Peremptory Writ of Mandate and for
judgment against plaintiff for the amount of money 1
paid to him by defendant Salt Lake City since the '
commencing of this action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff was a salaried employee at the Salt Lake
City cemetery until the 13th day of January, 1967.
when he was discharged for his activities in regards
to an accident that occurred on January 11, 1967. in
which a fellow employee named Tuttle was injured
when struck by a hammer thrown by Hamley, another
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employee. The plaintiff was involved with the two in
horseplay. Tuttle had an oil gun and was squirting
plaintiff with oil; plaintiff .ran from the area. Hamley
threw a hammer at the ml can. The hammer, which
had a very sharp point, struck Tuttle's hand, causing
a serious mJury. The trio of employees told their
supervisor that Tuttle caught his hand on a nail. Thereafter Tuttle was sent for medical treatment. At a later
tillle, the supervisor found that the injury resulted
:rom horseplay. Plaintiff was approached to tell the
true story, but refused to say anything about it. After
ciefendants found out the true facts, Hamley was fired
and Tuttle had, in the meantime, quit. Plaintiff was
given the choice of resigning or being fired. Plaintiff
refused to quit and was, therefore, discharged. He filed
his appeal with the City Employees' Appeal Board and
on the 26th day of January, 1967, an appeal board
meeting was held. The board voted 4 to I to recommend
reinstatement of the plaintiff with the penalty of 14
days' lost pay. (Plaintiff's exhibits 2 and 3). On J anuary 31, 1967, the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
City considered the recommendation of the appeal
board, but voted to uphold the discharge, with Commissioner Barker voting nay, Commissioner Holley
absent, and Commissioner Harrison, Catmull and
Mayor Lee voting for dismissal. The facts are undisputed by the parties. It was from this decision that
plaintiff took exception and filed his action contending
that the Commission was without authority to act.

3

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Legislature in 1947 enacted a st t
a ute that
.h d
.
t
bl
es a is e a pension fund for municipal

·
emplovee1
As protection
for the employees and to estab}' h.. ·

tenure, Sections 4 and 5 of Chapter 19 Lan fisUJoh
•
'
,{S 0 Ttah
were mcluded. The contents are as follows:
'

"All appointive officers and e. mploy
.
. .
f h
ees o!
?Ibes o t e first, second, and third class and
mc?rporated towns, other than members of the
police and fire ~epartments and heads of departments, supermtendents, shall hold their
:ploymen~ without li~ita~ion of time, being s:~:
Ject to discharge or d1sm1ssal only as hereinaftrr
provided.
·
"No officer or employe covered by the next
preceding section shall be discharged or dismissed
or transferred to a position with less remuneration because of his politics or religious belief or
incident to or through changes either in the elec.
tive officers, governing body or heads of departments. In all cases where any such officer or
employee is discharged or dismissed or trans·
ferred from one position to another for an) '
reason, he shall have the right to appeal such
discharge or dismissal or transfer to a board
. to be known as the Appeal Board, consisting of
· five members, three of whom shall be chosen
by and from the appointive office:s and em·
ployees and two of whom shall be city collllills·
sioners.
"The appeal shall be taken by filing written
notice of such appeal with the. City Rec.ord.er
within fifteen days after such discharge, d1sm1s·
sal or transfer. Upon the filing of such appeal
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the City Recorder shall forthwith ref er the same
to said Appeal B~ard f?r it~ action. Such appeal
board shall make mvestigations, take and receive
evidence bearing upon the cause for such discharge, dismissal or transfer and shall make
findings and recommendations in regard thereto
to the governing body of said city. In the event
the Appeal Board shall uphold such dismissal
or transfer the case shall be closed and no further
proceedings shall be had. In the event the Appeal
Board does not uphold such dismissal or transfer then such officer or employee may have 15
days thereafter to appeal to said governing body
whose decision shall be final. In such case such
appointive officer or employee shall be discharged, dismissed or transferred, where an appeal is taken, except upon a concurrence of at
least a majority of the membership of the governing body of said city. The three members of
said Appeal Board to be chosen by and from the
appointed officers and employees and the two
commissioners to serve on said Board shall be
chosen at such times and in such manner for
such times as the governing body of said cities
shall by ordinance prescribe; provided, that no
method of selection of such appointive officer
and employee representatives on such Appeal
Board shall be prescribed as shall in any manner
interfere with their free selection by such appointive officers and employees."
The 1955 Legislature then revised this provision
to read as follows:
"No officer or employee covered by the next
preceding section shall be discharged or. transferred to a position with less re~unera~10~ because of his politics or religious behef, or mc1dent
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to, or through changes, either in the el t'
fi cers, governmg
.
b
ec Ive f
ody, or heads of departm
~In all cases where any such officer or
len,~.
is discharged or transferred froin oneemp oyec
to another for any reason, he shall have t~hositiou
.
e rigl t
t o appea1 sueh d ischarge
or transfer to a b °'1
t? be known as the appeal board which shall ~,~~d
s1st of five members, three ~f _whom shall b~
chosen by and from the appomtive officers anr1·
emp1oyees, and two of whom shall be memb .
of the board of City Commissioners.
er~
"_The appeal shall be t~ken by filing writteB
notice of such appeal with the city recorder
within ten ( 10) days after such discharge 'Jt
transfer. Upon the filing of such appeal the
city recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the
same to said appeal board. Upon receipt of the
referral from the city recorder, the appeal board
shall forthwith commence its investigation, take
and receive .evidence and fully hear and deter.
mine the matter which relates to the cause for
such discharge or transfer.

"The employee shall be entitled to appear in
person and to be represented by counsel, to have
a public hearing, to confront the witnesses whose ,
testimony is to be considered, and to examine the
evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
1

"In the event the appeal board shall uphold
such discharge or transfer the case shall be closed
and no further proceedings shall be had. In the
event the appeal board does not u.phold such
discharge or transfer then such officer or em·
ployee may have 14 days thereaf~e! to appeal
to said governing body whose declSlon shall be
final.
6

!

"The decision of the appeal board may be by
secret ballot, and shall be certified to the city
recorder within fifteen (15) days from the date
the ma.t~er is ref~rred to it. The board may, in
its dec1s10n, provide that an employee shall recei:e his . sal.ary for the period of time during
which he 1s ~1scharged, or any deficiency in salary
for the per10d he was transferred to a position
of less remuneration but not to exceed a fifteen
day period. In no case shall such appointive
officer or employ~e be discharged or transferred,
where an appeal is taken, except upon a concurrence of at least a majority of the membership
of the governing body of said city.
"In the event that the appeal board does not
uphold such discharge, or transfer, the city
recorder shall certify the decision to the employee affected, and also to the head of the department from whose order the appeal was taken.
Said employee shall be paid his salary, commencing with the next working day following
the certification by the city recorder of the appeal
board's decison, provided that the employee, or
officer, concerned reports for his assigned duties
during that next working day.
"The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, and the designation
of their terms of office shall be prescribed by
the governing body of said city by ordinance;
provided that the provisions for choosing the
three members from the appoinetd officers and
employees shall in no way restrict a free selection of such members by the appointive officers
and employees of said city."
The trial court interpreted the provision dealing
with the decision of the appeal board as follows :
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"The relevant words of the statute are· ,
the event the Appeals Board shall uph Id· Iii
discharge or transfer, the case shall b~ cl~uch
and no further proceeding shall be had I sec!
e:'ent the Appeals Board does not uph~ldns the
discharge or transfer, then such officer uch
0
ployee may have 15 days thereafter to ar ern;
t o sa1·d governmg
·
board whose decision shall
ppeaib
final.' The court has italicized three words ab .e
Oie
.
.
t o sh ow t he o bv10us
error m wording of these
sentences of the statute.
"It is clear to this court that the legislatur·
meant 'In the event the Appeals Board shall n;,~
uphold such discharge or transfer, the case shall
be closed and no further proceedings shall be
had. In th~ event the Appeals Board does uphold such discharge or transfer, then such officer
or employee may have 15 days thereafter to
appeal to said governing board whose decision
shall be final.' The court has not rewritten th~i
statute, it has merely placed the word 'not' where
it properly belongs in the two sentences, remoting it out of the second and placing it into the
first." (Emphasis added.) (R. 24).

!

1

The issue then before the court is the proper inter- ,
pretation of Sec. 49-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Did the Legislature intend to reserve to the elected
governing body the final determination in an employee
discharge case or did it intend that the decision of ,
the employee appeal board be the final action on such '
matters?
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF SEC. 49-2-5, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IN THAT TO GIVE
1'0 THE APPEAL BOARD THE FINAL DECISION VIOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF
ART. VI, § 29 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
By its decision the trial court held that the plain
meaning of Sec. 49-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
i1as not the intent of the Legislature. (R. 23, 24 and
:2.5). It determined that the appeal board held the
final power as to the discharge of an employee. (R.
25.) If this was the intent of the Legislature, then
the appeal board is a special commission not elected
by the people and set up to perform a municipal function. This would be in violation of Art. VI, § 29, of
the Utah Constitution, which says:

"The legislatiure shall not delegate to any
special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money,
property or effects, whether held in trust or
otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol site,
or to perform any municipal functions." (Emphasis added.)
This section has been interpreted on numerous
occasions by this court. In the Logan City v. Public

Utilities Commission of Utah, et al., 72 U. 536, 271
9

P. 9~ I, . ( 1938) , the concurring opinion of Justice Girl.
eon mdicated the purpose of the above const't t. ·
I U IO!laj
provision:

. ": . . the section is a limitation of power of the
leg1slature to delegat~ !o any body, save onlii the
regu~arly elected ~ffzczal~ of the municipalities
the right to supervise or mterfere with the pr··
erties of the municipalities or to perform ~P:
municipal functions." (Emphasis added.) Il)
Also, in the majority opinion from the same case:
"We think it c~ear. that the ~1_ldoubted purpose of the constitutional provision is to hold
inviolate the right of local self-government of
cities and towns with respect to municipal improvements, money, property, effects, the levying
of taxes and the performance of municipal functions."
In State Water Pollution Control Board v. Salt
Lake City, 6 U. 2d 247, 3ll P.2d 370, (1957), this
court said:
"It is to be kept in mind that the very purpose
of § 29, Art. VI, prohibiting the delegation of
powers of supervision to any special co~ssion
over cities was to insure insofar as practicable
the powers to cities and towns to manage their
own internal affairs . . . "
After quoting from the Logan City case, the
court continues:
"If the constitutional provision wa~ intended
. to assure .the city freedom from. outside supervision and control, it most certamly seems that
it must be with respect to their primary and essential functions."

IO

Just recently this court commented upon the intention of the Constitutional convention and their reason
for including the provision before us in our Constitution, saying:
"'Ve are convinced that the framers of our
state constitution wisely anticipated the inroads
that might be cut in the structure of local represen~ative government, which fundamentally is
ccmposed of officials elected by those closest to
go,:ernment,. the electo_rs, when they judiciously
ins1sted on mcorporatmg Art. VI, § 29, as a
must in our constitution." Backman v. Salt Lake
County, 13 U. 2d 412, 375 P.2d 756 (1962).
To sustain and uphold the contention of plaintiff
un<l the decision of the trial court would give to a
''special commission", the appeal board, the right of
supervision over the officers and employees of the city.
To control the power of whether or not an employee
will be discharged is to ultimately control the performance of municipal functions. Employees who may
not be inclined to perform adequately at all times can
only be controlled by the realization that they may
be discharged for failure to properly perform their
duties. Loss of control over the officers and employees
of a municipality by the elected officers means, in the
last an!llysis, lack of control over the proper performance of municipal functions, services and maintenance
of property.
The appeal board has a majority of members who
are employees elected by their fellow employees. These
three employees are under no restraint, except as to

11

pressure from those who elected them. It is, theref
a distinct possibility, if the decision of the tr' 1 ore,
ia court
is allowed to stand, that the elected officials
.
.
~~~
discharge an officer or employee because such dish
c arge
can be overruled by the employee-dominated appea1,
board. Thus, the three employees can directly control
the performance of duties required of municipalities.
As indicated by this court on numerous occasions
the purpose of Art. VI, § 29, of the Utah Constitution,
is to protect and hold inviolate the right and duty 0;
the elected officials to control the essential operations
and functions of local government of which none could
be more basic than control over the employees.

Well settled law, as well as common sense, dictates
that where there can be two possible interpretations
of a legislative enactment, one causing the enactment ,
to be in violation of the constitution, and the other to
be valid, the cpurt must choose that interpretation
which is valid based on the assumption that the Legislature intends its acts.to be constitutional. 11 Am. Jur.
pp. 729, 730, Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 2 U
2d 566, 272 P.2d 177, (1954).

1

The trial court by ruling that the true intention of
the Legislature would best be indicated by removing
the word "not" from one sentence and placing it in
the other (paragraph 4 of Sec. 49-2-5, U.C.A. 1953)
has ereated an appeal board that is a "special com·
mission," which is in violation of Art. VI, § 29, of the
Utah State Constitution.
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POINT II
TO PROPERLY PERFORM ITS MUNICILAL FUNCTIONS AND MAINTAIN ITS
PROPERTY, THE SALT LAKE CITY COM:JIISSION :MUST HA VE POWER TO HIRE
AND DISCHARGE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, WITHIN REASON, AS A MEANS
OF PROPER CONTROL.
H i" well established that municipal corporations
an~ f mned· and authorized as political subdivisions to
perform tasks and duties for the protection and general
'."elfcffe of the public. Said organizations are created
tc• pr(_wide fire and police protection, health standards
and enforcement, to purchase and develop public properties for recreation and cultural development, for the
planning and building of public thoroughfares, sewers
and public waterworks, and even public operation of
utilties. The regulation, control and administration of
such political bodies are of necessity vested in elected
officials who must periodically answer to the citizens
cf the municipality by standing for election. Their
standards of conduct and administration of their duties
are constantly scrutinized by the electorate.

It goes without saying that the elected officials
hav:: neither sufficient time nor adequate skills to per·
form all the necessary work to effectively carry out
their required duties. The elected officials are only able
to formulate general policies of operation and performance. They must rely upon department heads, officers,
13

supervisory personnel and employees to accompl' h
•
IS the
d es1red
results. To insure efficient performan
ce and
the proper use of public funds, elected officials
1
use wise discretion in the selection of municipal~Us:
ployees. It is, however, impossible to clearly f rn
oreser
the ability and future conduct of each employee hired
It is, therefore, of necessity that the right to hire ca
fries
with it the right to discharge. 37 Am. Jur. 869. Thi~
right is firmly established in the common law and bi
court decision. An employee who is unsatisfactorv i:.
his work or conduct may thwart and stall the definite
performance of required municipal functions.
•

•J

The practical aspects of this established rule are
readily apparent and firmly establishes the necessity
of such a rule in maintaining efficiency and proper
handling of the functions required of the municipalities
of this state.
Along with this rule of proper personnel manage·
ment also must be considered the public's interest in
establishing a work force that has the requisite skills
and abilities to efficiently and adequately perform the
necessary tasks. The employees are better able to build
a career if some safeguards are established creating
tenure in their employment.
These two principles must then be balanced for
the public's good. To allow public elected officials t~
hire and fire at will creates an inefficient system of
pork barrelling, much to the detriment of the general

14

public. Likewise, to ~erm~t _job tenure to be the ultimate
c.riteria creates an meffic1ent system which is detrimental to the tax-paying public.
The 19.J.7 Utah Legislature, desiring to give to
wunicipal employees tenure, job protection and a retirement fund, created an appeal board for the purpose
"f rE'\·iewmg the facts and circumstances of an em;i]o\'ee's dismissal with the right to make recommenda.':cH;" tu the governing body concerning the appropriJteue:-is of the employee's discharge, Chapter 19, Laws
uf Ctah 1947, Sections 4 and 5. The Act established
that employees may not be dismissed for religious or
political belief or changes in elective officers and department heads. It further provided a procedure to be
followed by an employee to appeal his discharge. After
the appeal board investigated and made its recommendation. the Act declared as follows:
"In the event the appeal board shall uphold
such dismissal or transfer the case shall be closed
and no further proceedings shall be had. In
the event the appeal board does not uphold such
dismissal or transfer, then such officer or employee may have 15 days thereafter to appeal
to said governing body whose decision shall be
final."
It is clear from the language of the Act that a
discharged employee had the right to have his dismissal
im·estigated by an appeal board which consisted of three
fell ow employees and two city commissioners. If the
board concurred with the employee's supervisor, then

15

there can be little doubt that the discharge w
as proper
The employee had the opportunity to present h' ·
Is case
. h
.
.
t o a board we1g
ted m his favor with the ma· ·
Jorrty 0f
members being fellow employees and naturall
.
h"
Y sym.
pathebc to is cause. Th~refore, it is only reasonable
to expect that the governmg body, were it to consider
the matter, could decide only in favor of the discharge.
If, however, it were the appeal board's recommen.
dation that the discharge was improper, then theri:
existed a variance of opinion. On one side stood the
supervisor, a department head, who felt that the em·
ployee should be discharged, and on the other, voting
not to uphold the discharge was the appeal board. wm
this difference of opinion it is only natural that the
governing body, made up of elected officials respon .
sible only to the people and who hold the duty to over·
see the performance of municipal functions, should then
make the final decision as to whether the discharge
was proper. The employee had the advantage of the
appeal board's recommendation when presenting his
cause to the Board of City Commissioners.
The procedures for handling these matters were
clearly outlined by the original act in 1947. Without
doubt, the final decision was to be made by the elected
officials who could best protect the interests of both the
general public and the employee. Thus, the efficient
performance of municipal functions would be assured.
The provisions of the 1947 Act as to who should make
the final decision carried over to the later act. The final

16

decision as to employee discharge is, therefore, in the
hands of the elected officials where it should properly
be for the protection of all concerned.

POINT III
FRO.M THE PAPERS AND JOURNALS
OF THE 1955 UTAH LEGISLATURE PERTAIN ING TO THE ENACTMENT OF CHAPTER 81, LAWS OF UTAH, 1955, AMENDING
SECTION 49-2-5, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, IT IS READILY APP ARENT THAT IT
\VAS THE STRICT INTENTION OF THE
LEGISLATURE TO GIVE TO THE GOVERNING BODY THE FINAL DECISION IN AN
EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE CASE.
"Where the literal meaning of words does not
appear to be in harmony with the purpose of
the Act, this court will look into the reasons and
history of the enactment."
J ack.rnn Livestock v. State Tax Commission, 123

U. 411, 259 P.2d 1084 (1953).

The legislative history of Sec. 49-2-5, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, is as follows:
The appeal board was initially set up by the passage of Chapter 19 of the Laws of Utah, 1947. The Act
was clear in that it reserved to the elected governing
body the final determination in an employee discharge
matter. Various sections of this act were carried over

17

into the law as it now reads, which will be
·
rev1e
11 ejr
hereafter.
On the nineteenth day of the legislature ( l'
"enatt
Journal 1955 .Session, p. 7 4), an amendment to the
1947 Act wa~ mtroduced in the Senate and designated
as Senate Bill No. 57 (see appendix for full text of
original bill). After being sent to the appropriJle
committees (1955 Senate Journal pps. 89-120), it ''m
placed on the second reading calendar. The 1955 Sen
ate Journal, at page 219, states it was read and
required to hold its position on the second readuir
calendar. This indicates there were objections to th:
bill as written. On the thirty-third day of the legislature
a motion was made and passed that the rules be suspended, that the body and heading of the original hill
be deleted and that the second bill be substituted and
inserted (see appendix for full text). This bill, after
a few minor changes, was then placed on the third reading calendar. It was subsequently passed by the Senate '
and referred to the House of Representatives who
likewise approved the bill. Thereafter, it was signed into
law by the Governor.
1

Most laws passed by the Utah Legislature must
stand strictly on the language of the Act because there
are no transcripts of the hearings of committees or
the proceedings and debates of the House and Senate.
However, in the case of the revision of Section 49-2-5.
Utah Code Annotated 1953, we have a good insight
into the intent of the legislature. The fact that the

18

contents of the original bill were apparently objectionable as written, that parts were deleted and a new
version substituted, allows us to ascertain what points
were not acceptable and hence removed. A close ex:Jmination of the proposed original bill, intermediate
bill and final bill, which are reproduced in the appendix
•)f this brief, will show that the legislature did not intend
to give the appeal board power to make a final decision.
In reading the bills, it should be noted that the new
additions or amendments are underlined, parts or sections to be deleted are enclosed in brackets and the
parts to be unchanged left unmarked.
Except for the first part the original draft of
Senate Bill No. 57 was a complete revision, eliminating
that part of the 1947 Act dealing with the effect of
the decison of the appeal board, which read as follows.:
"In the event the Appeal Board shall uphold
such dismissal or transfer the case shall be closed
and no further proceedings shall be had. In the
event the Appeal Board does not uphold such
dismissal or transfer then such officer or employee may have 15 days thereafter to appeal
to said governing body whose decision shall be
final."
The first bill of 1955 stated as follows:

"The decision of the Appeal Board may be by
secret ballot, shall be certified to the City Recorder within fifteen (15) days from the date the
matter is referred to it, and shall be final." (Emphasis added.)

19

In reading on, it is readily apparent that th
e subst.
. .
.
quen t prov1s10ns are predicated upon the pr ..
' ' . .
.
opos1ho1J
that the appeal boards aec1s10n is the final sa · , ' .
y in dli
matter. 1 his proposed power of final decision granter'
to the appeal board is vastly different from its
"
POWtl'
as granted under the 1947 Act, stated above. - ·
The 1947 Act and the first proposed 1955 Bil
are exactly and diametrically opposed to each other.
As indicated ( 1955 Senate Journal, page 2
191
the first proposed bill was not completely aci:eutabit
to the Senate as the Bill was retained on the s~co:>d
reading calendar. A few days later, the sec:md dr&ft
was substituted. In that draft the clause "an<l shall
be final," in the fourth paragraph of the first bill referring to the decision of the appeal board, and quoted
above, was deleted and the old provision from the l94i
Act retained, which provided that the final decision
shall be made by the governing body.
The title of the Act had to be changed to delete
the word "final" from the "final decision" so as not tu
leave that impression. In so altering the Act, the Legii·
lature took parts from the old Act which clearly gare
the elected officials the final decision and combined
them with the new Act, which had been oriented to ti1e
appeal board having the :final determination, thus ere·
ating a statute which, when read as a whole, becomes
confusing because the various parts do not complement
each other. Because of this confused status one must
read the Act in light of the revision of the originai
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,
'
1

,

:
,

draft to clearly understand the intent of the Legislature.
There can be no doubt that it was the intent of the
Legislators to retain in the governing body the final
say on an employee's discharge when the phrase "and
shall be final" was deleted from the original draft of
the 1955 amendment in the provision dealing with the
appeal board's decision and the language of the 1947
.\.ct inserted in its place. To allow the trial court
to moYe the word "not" from one sentence to the other
not only fails to consider the above intent of the Legislature, but completely ignores the fact that these two
sentences were closely considered and were specifically
placed back in the Act after having been removed m
the original draft of Senate Bill No. 57.
',\Then reading alone the following,
"In the event the appeal board shall uphold
such discharge or transfer the case shall be dosed
and no further proceedings shall be had. In the
event the appeal board does not uphold such
discharge or transfer then such officer or employee may have 15 days thereafter to appeal
to said governing body whose decision shall be
final."
the language is clear. Only when compared to a subsequent paragraph,
"In the event that the appeal board does not
uphold such discharge, or transfer.,. the 'city
recorder shall certify the decision to the employee affected, and also to the head of the de-
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partment from whose order the app 1
ta k en. S a1"d emp1oyee sha11 be paid hisea . l11·~'·~
.
"th h
sa an
~ommhencmg_fi~I . t eb next working day folloi; ·
mg t e cerb cat10n y the city recorder f h.
appeal board's decision, provided that t'1 1° t t
d
e e11i.
~l oyee, or ?ff 1cer,_ concerne
reports for his~~signed duties durmg that next working day.
Because the Legislature not only refused to pa\,
the amendment as originally introduced which 'Vat'Uti1
have made the appeal board's decision final, but ab
substituted another draft which contained the preci)i·
language of the 1947 enactment, making the decisiul!
of the governing body final, such action on the pari
of the Legislature clearly negatives any intent to nullify such clear language and intent by the languag'e o(
the subsequent paragraph in the amendment relating
to procedure, as above quoted. Therefore, if there 15
a conflict between these two provisions of the statute,
the interpretation of the subsequent paragraph should
be construed to conform to the clear intent of the first
quoted paragraph, instead of the opposite way as
plaintiff contends. To change the "not" from one sentence to the other so that it may appear to be in close
harmony with subsequent paragraphs, the contents of
which are dependent upon the provisions of the first.
is putting the cart before the horse.
'

I

From 50 Am. Jur., 322, is the following:
"Rules against reading anything int~ a statu!e
by implication are p~rticularly apphc~ble ,0
provisions expressly re3ected by the Legislature.
In the interpretation of a statute of doubtful
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1

1

impor~, the. fact that a provision originally in
a bill is om~tted from the Act as finally passed
by. the ~eg1slature, has bee~ r~garded as a sigmticant factor. !hus, t~e.reJechon by the Legislature of a specific prov1s10n contained in an Act
as originally reported has been held most persuasive to the conclusion that the Act should
not be so construed as in effect to include that
provision, at least, where there is no basis for
the assumption that the words omitted were
deemed to be surplusage."

Even though the subsequent paragraph was created
to go with the first draft, it may easily be interpreted
to be a protection to the employees. If the appeal
board's recommendation is favorable to the employee,
he then is entitled to an appeal to the Board of Commissioners. The Act does not prescribe a time limit
upon the governing body to make its decision. The
employee is able to return to his employment to await
the decision of the Board of Commissioners.
As to the question of whether the Legislature
inadvertently placed the "not" in the wrong place,
consider the fact that the two sentences in question
were enacted after careful consideration in 1947. The
clear meaning of that statute was in effect for eight
years and well understood. These two sentences and
their clear meaning were rejected and excluded by
the draftees of the original bill introduced in the 1955
Legislature. They were then returned to Senate Bill
No . .57 after the Senate members rejected a diametrically opposite provision. To assume that the Legis23

lature did not closely examine the exact w d'
. .
or lllg r;;
the above provision would be completely im ·
.
proper
The idea and effect of the original paragraph w , ·
.
~~
as enacted m 1947, when it was reintroduced · ·
.
.
.
.
Ill t1lt
substitute bill m 1955. It carried with it the
.
san11
meanmg and effect. If it were to be changed the L ·
egislature would have moved the "not" to a different position on its own motion. This rule of statutory construction is best stated in Sutherland Statutory c011 •
struction, 3d Ed. Vol. 1, Section 1933, pp. 425-42ti.
as follows:
"Provisions of the original act or section which
are repeated in the body of the amendmeni
either in the same or equivalent words, are considered a continuation of the original law. Thii
rule of interpretation is applicable even thoua1,
the original act or section is expressly declar~d
to be repealed.
"Words and provisions used in the original
act or section are presumed to be used in the
same sense in the amendment. Moreover, the
legislature is presumed to know the prior construction of the original act, and if words or
provisions in the act or section amended that
had been previously construed are repeated u
the amendment, it is held that the legislature
adopted the prior construction of the word or
. . ''
prov1s1on.
The trial court did err in its interpretation of Sec·
tion 49-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as outlined
in its Conclusion of Law (R. 23, R. 24, R. 25) and,
the refore, improperly issued a Writ of Mandamus
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agamst defendants requiring that plaintiff be reinstated
in his job.
CONCLUSION
The right to hire carries with it the right to discharge. The 1947 law recognized this orderly and time
tested principle in the administration of municipal
~o\·ernment.
It expressly made the decision of the
governing body final. It had created a board with a
majority being employees of the city. It realized that
such a board should not be the final arbiter of whether
the facb warranted discharge. The employee members
were not given the power to negate the control vested
in the governing body. To grant such power should
require clear and certain language to that effect. The
1955 amendment here involved not only did not grant
such power, but expressly denied it by restoring in
the bill as finally passed the identical language of the
1947 law. The power should not be made to depend
upon an arbitrary transposing of a word from one
sentence to another as if the Legislature did not know
it was employing the wrong word in the wrong place.
Such legerdemain attempts a construction of the statute by ignoring plain language in a supposed attempt
to create an interpretation harmonious with other provisions which can be clearly made harmonious with the
stated intent to make the decision of the governing
hody final.
Furthermore, the interpretation made of Section
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49-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, by the trial cou
1
indeed creates a special commission comprised of mr,
ein.
bers not elected by the general public to perform u1;
essential and elementary municipal function. Sue\i
"special conunission" is specifically prohibited by Art
VI, § 29 of our Utah Constitution.

Respectfully submitted,
HOMER HOLMGREN
City Attorney
PAUL G. GRANT
Assistant City Attorney
414 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDAXT
&APPELLANT
SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION
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By Messrs. Davis and Openshaw

S. B. No. 57

AN ACT AMENDING SECTION 49-2-5, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953.
PROVIDING FOR TENURE OF OFFICE AND COVERING DISCHARGE, OR TRANSFER OF APPOINTIVE OFFICERS AND. EM
PLOYEES OF CITIES OF THE FIRST CLASS, OTHER THAN MEMBERS OF T'IE POLICE, FIRE OR HEALTH DEPARTMENT; PROVIDING FOR AN APPEAL FROM SUCH DISCHARGE OR TRANS·
FER; CREATING A BOARD OF APPEAL WITH THE POWER TO
FULLY HEAR THE MATTER AND GIVE A FINAL DECISION.

Be it enacted by the Legiolature of the State of Utah:

Section l.

Sec. 49-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended to

read:

49-2-5.

No officer or employee covered by the next preceding section

shall be discharged [or dismissed l or transferred to a position with leas
remuneration because of his politics or religious belief or incident to or
through changes eithe. in the elective officers, governing body or heads of
departments. In all cases where any such officer or employee is discharared
~or

dismissed] or transferred from one position to another for any rea-

son, he shall have the right to appeal such discharge [or dismissal] or

10

transfer to a board to be known as the appeal board, [consisting] which

11

shall consist of five members, three of whom shall be chosen by and from

12

the appointive officers and employees and two of whom shall be [city com-

13

missioners] members of the Board of City Commissioners.

14

The appeal shall be taken by filing written notice of such appeal with

15

the city recorder within [fifteen] ten (10) days after such discharge,

16

[dismissal J or transfer. Upon the filing of such appeal the city recorder

17

shall forthwith refer~ the same to said appeal board (for ita
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action J. [Such] Upon receipt of the r~ferral from the city recordr>r, the

appeal board shall [make] ~~011

its investigations, take arid

receive evidence [bearing upon the

for

l

'

~ischarge, disr .....J.l or

transfer and shall make findings and recommendations

l!'l

regard thereto

to the govarnlng body of .Ille.Id clty. In the event tlle appeal board $hall up-

6

hold such dismissal or transfer the case shall be closed and no furtner

proceedings shall be had.] and fully hear and determine the matter which
8

relates to the cause for such discharge or transfer.
The employee shall be entitled to appear in person and to be repre-

10

sented by counsel. to have a public hearing, to confront the witnesses whose

11

testimony is to be considered, and to examine the evidence to be considered

12

by the appeal board.

13

The decision of the appeal board may be by secret ballot, shall be
certified to the city recorder within fifteen (15) days from the date the

15

matter is referred to it, and shall be final. The board may, in its decision,

16

provide that an employee shall receive his salary for the period of time

17

during which he is discharged, or any deficiency in salary for the period

18

he was transferred to a position of less remuneration, but not to exceed

19

a fifteen day period. In the event

20

such [dismissal] discharge, or transfer [then such officer or employee may

21

have 15 days thereafter to appeal to said governing body whose decision

22

shall be final. In such case such appointive officer or employee shall be dis-

~

the appeal board does not uphold

23

charged, dismissed or transferred, where an appeal is taken, except upon

24

a concurrence of at least a majority of the membership of the govern-

25

ing body of said city. The three members of said appeal board to be

26

chosen by and from the appointed officers and employees and the two

27
28

29
30
31
32
:l3

commissioners to serve on said board shall be chosen at such times and
in such manner for such times as the governing body of said cities shall by
ordinance prescribe; provided, that no method of selection of such appointive officer and employee representatives on such appeal board shall be
prescribed as shall in any manner interfere with their free selection by
such appointive officers and employees.] the city recorder shall certify
the decision to the employee affected, and also to the head of the depart-

28
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ment from whose order the appeal was taken. Said employee shall be paid
hi~:

salary, commencing with the next working day following the certifi-

c:ition Ly the city recorder of the appeal board's decision, provided that the
('mployee, or officer. concerned reports for his assigned duties during
that next working day.

The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board,
:ind

the designation of their terms of office shall be prescribed by the

governing body of said city by ordinance; provided, that the provisions for
choosing the three members from the appointed officers and employees
~o

11

shall in no way restrict a free selection of such members by the appointive
vfficers and employees of said city.
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AN ACT TO AMEND SEC'.;' ION 49-2-5' UTAH

corn:

ANNOTATED 1953

TENURE OF OFFICE AND COVERING DISCHARGE

'

c "

"

, P.. o. IDJ.l~G FOR
OR Tb ""FER
'""'"

OF IJ'FOIN!rvz

OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF CITIES. GrHER Tu'
,,,.N MEi.(BERS OF THE F01lCE'
FIRE OR HEJ.LTH DEPARTMENT j PROVIDING FOR AN APPEAL FROM DIJC!i!JlGE OF.
TRANSFER: CREATING A BOARD CF AFFEAL WITH POWER TO FULLY HEAR T"nE
MATTER AND GIVE FINA,L DECISION.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utaht

Section l.

Sec. 49-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, :!.a am.ended to

read:
Section

49-2-5.

No officer or employee covered by the next precM.irig

section sh.all be discharged

Lor

dismissedJ or transferred to a poaitior.

with less remuneration because of his politics or religious belief, or
incideint to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, gov-am~
ing body 1 or heads of departments.

employee is discharged

In all cases ll'here any such offleer

Lor diamissedJ er transferl"ed

Dt

from one position

t'>

another for any reason, he shall have the right to appe.al such discharge
['"or dismissalJ or transfer to a board to be knolVll as the appeal board
which shall consist CconsistingJcf five members, three of whom, shall he
chosen by and from the appointive officers and employees, and two of whom
shall be Ccity CorranissionersJ members of the board of City Conmissioners,
The appeal shall be taken by filing written notice of such appeal
With the city recorder Within ["fi.fteen_7 ten (10) da.ys after such discharge ["dismissalJ or transfer.

Upon the filing of such appeal, the city

recorder shall forthWith refer a copy of the same to said appeal ooard

Ltor its actionJ.

Upon receipt of tha referral from t.he city recorder,

["such_7 ~appeal board shall (makeJ fcrthwith coll!!llence its investigatioo,
take and receive evidence Lbearing upon the cause for such discharge, dismissal or transfer, and shall make findings and recommendations in regard thereto to the governing body of the cityJ and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for such discharge or transfer.
The employee shall 'be entitled to awear in parson and to be represented by c-;unsel, to have a public hearing, to confront the witnesses whose
testimony is to be cons1·d ere d , an:l. to examine the evidence to be considered
by the appeal board.
In the event the appeal board shall uphold such discharge or transfer
C'...6")£.

s

~ be closed and no .further proceedings shall be had •
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I " ,.

ever.t :n~ appElal hoard doP.s not uphold such dischArge or transfer then suo"'o.Cf:cer o:- >?.rrlpl0yee 11:.ay have

lflb

o·~iy

15 days thereafter to appeal to said govern-

wnose decision shall be final.

Thi:: decision of the arrP-al h('\ard may he by secret hallot, shall be
":-t"oied to tne city recorder within fif'teen (15) days frnm the 1ate the
rL<'r.er ", s referred. to it.

The hoard may, in its decision, provide that an

shall receive his salary for the period of time during which he

6 rr.n2.oy00
j::;

iiorr.arged, or any deficiency in salary for the period he was transferrec

~__ 0

a positic·r. of less remunAration hut not exceed a fifteen day peried.

;_ n

('9,:i.·:T-1_] ~

case shall such appointive o.fficer or employeA [shall.J

·ca 1ischarged Ldi.9missedJ or transferred, where an appeal ia taken, except

. . . r:on a concurrence cf at least a majority of the membership of the govcrn~r.'~ hod."V of said city. 0'he three rr.embera of said appeal bNU"d to be

cr.oseri f'iY and from the appointed officers and employees and the two ct'.lllrriss1or.ers to serve on said board shall be chosen at such times and in
sucri i:r.anner

nrdinance

ff"r such times as the governing body of said cities shall by

prasori~e;

provided, that no method of selection of such

oi.ppGintive 1Jfficer and employee reproaentatives on such appea.l Board
shail )"le prescribed aa shall in any manner interfere rlth theiir frr.e

selactior. by such appointive officers and employees.J
Ir. the event tr.at the appeal bo2.rd does not uphold such discharge,

er

trar.sf~r,

aff13cted

1

the city reccirder shall certify the decision to the employee

and also t<i the he.ad of the department from whose order the

anpeal was taken.

Sa.id employee shall be paid his salary, camnencing with the

r.ext Werking day following the certification by the city
aopea} Coard 1s decisi()n, provided that the employee,

CT

rec~rder

eif the

officer, ccincemed

reports for his assigned duties during that next working day.

rte method and n:.anner of cheesing the memhers f"f the appeal board,

<.:.nd tf.e designation of their terms of cffice shall be prescribed by the
g?verr1.lr1g b"'>dy of said city 'ry "rdinance; prcvided that the provisicns

:'or crioosing the three memhers from the appointed officers and emplC'IY8'9S
sr.a:.l i.'1 nc way restrict a frea sel~ction Clf such memrers by the arpointive
0ffi0Rrs and e.rnii!-~&-s of a aid city.
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